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Dispositional anxiety is a well-established risk factor for the development of psychiatric
disorders along the internalizing spectrum, including anxiety and depression. Importantly,
many of the maladaptive behaviors characteristic of anxiety, such as anticipatory
apprehension, occur when threat is absent. This raises the possibility that anxious
individuals are less efficient at gating threat’s access to working memory, a limited capacity
workspace where information is actively retained, manipulated, and used to flexibly guide
goal-directed behavior when it is no longer present in the external environment. Using
a well-validated neurophysiological index of working memory storage, we demonstrate
that threat-related distracters were difficult to filter on average and that this difficulty
was exaggerated among anxious individuals. These results indicate that dispositionally
anxious individuals allocate excessive working memory storage to threat, even when it
is irrelevant to the task at hand. More broadly, these results provide a novel framework
for understanding the maladaptive thoughts and actions characteristic of internalizing
disorders.
Keywords: anxiety disorders, attention, contralateral delay activity (CDA), emotion-cognition interactions, event-
related potential (ERP), individual-differences, trait anxiety, working memory
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety disorders are debilitating, highly prevalent, and asso-
ciated with substantial morbidity and mortality (Sareen et al.,
2005; Collins et al., 2011; Kessler et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2012).
High levels of dispositional anxiety and behavioral inhibition are
a well-established risk factor for anxiety, depressive, and other
psychiatric disorders (Lahey, 2009; Kotov et al., 2010; Blackford
and Pine, 2012; Clauss and Blackford, 2012), highlighting the
importance of understanding the neurocognitive underpinnings
of this key risk factor. Indeed, alterations in core cognitive pro-
cesses, such as executive control and working memory, are cen-
tral to neurocognitive theories of anxiety (Bishop, 2007, 2008;
Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck and Derakshan, 2011; Berggren and
Derakshan, in press).
Difficulties controlling the processing of threat are a central
feature of dispositional anxiety and the anxiety disorders; anx-
ious individuals frequently allow threat-related information to
unduly control their thoughts and actions. In particular, there
is considerable evidence that anxious individuals are biased to
allocate excess attention to threat-related cues when they are
present in the immediate environment (e.g., words, faces; Cisler
and Koster, 2010), even when this comes at the expense of task-
goals and on-going behavior (Bishop et al., 2004, 2007; Etkin
et al., 2009). This attentional bias to threat has been proposed
to be a specific causal risk factor for the development and main-
tenance of anxious psychopathology (Bar-Haim et al., 2007;
Hofmann et al., 2012; MacLeod and Mathews, 2012; Shechner
et al., 2012).
Importantly, many of the maladaptive thoughts and actions
characteristic of anxious individuals occur when threat-related
cues are absent from the immediate external environment (e.g.,
anticipatory apprehension, behavioral avoidance, and intrusive
thoughts)—a key clinical feature that is not addressed by research
focused on attentional biases to threat cues. This raises the
possibility that dispositional anxiety reflects a broader regula-
tory deficit that encompasses problems governing threat’s access
to working memory. Working memory is the “blackboard of
the mind” (Goldman-Rakic, 1996, p. 13473), a limited capac-
ity workspace where information is actively maintained, recalled,
and manipulated (Cowan, 2005; Baddeley, 2012). The internal
representation of task sets and other kinds of goals in work-
ing memory plays a critical role in sustaining goal-directed
attention, information processing (e.g., memory retrieval), and
action in the face of competition with potential sources of dis-
traction or interference (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Postle, 2006;
D’Ardenne et al., 2012). This framework suggests that the mal-
adaptive cognitive-behavioral profile characteristic of anxious
individuals reflects a failure to prevent threat from gaining
access to working memory. Allowing threat-related distracters
access to working memory would potentially allow them to
bias the stream of information processing after they are no
longer present in the external environment. Ultimately, the
unnecessary entry of threat into working memory may pro-
mote worry, intrusive thoughts, and other anxiety-related cog-
nitions that disrupt on-going behavior (Thiruchselvam et al.,
2012).
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Here, we used a well-validated neurophysiological measure
of working memory storage, contralateral delay activity (CDA;
Vogel and Machizawa, 2004), to directly test whether disposi-
tionally anxious individuals have difficulty preventing threat-
related distracters from gaining access to working memory. The
amplitude of the CDA, an event-related potential (ERP) that
persists throughout the retention period of visual working mem-
ory tasks, is highly sensitive to the number of items maintained
in working memory (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004; McCollough
et al., 2007; Ikkai et al., 2010; Voytek and Knight, 2010). We
measured CDA during a working memory task in which sub-
jects were instructed to selectively retain one or more emo-
tional faces while ignoring others (Sessa et al., 2011). Faces
were either threat-related (i.e., fearful; Whalen, 1998; Davis and
Whalen, 2001) or emotionally-neutral. This procedure allowed
us to quantify the number of task-irrelevant distracter faces
that gained access to working memory, indexed by increased
CDA amplitude (Vogel et al., 2005). Critically, it also made it
possible to measure the extent to which higher levels of dis-
positional anxiety, measured using the well-validated State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983), are associ-
ated with problems gating threat-related distracters from working
memory.
METHODS
SUBJECTS
Thirty-four (22 female) students from the University of
Wisconsin, Milwaukee community participated in exchange for
course extra-credit (M = 21.83 years, SD = 5.34). Subjects pro-
vided written informed consent prior to the experiment. The
study was approved by the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee’s
Institutional Review Board. One subject was removed due to
chance performance. Nine subjects were excluded from analyses
due to excessive ocular artifacts, a rate that is consistent with prior
researchusing similar tasks (e.g.,∼35%; Sessa et al., 2011). A total
of 24 subjects remained for further analysis.
QUANTIFYING DISPOSITIONAL ANXIETY
All subjects completed the trait version of the STAI (Spielberger
et al., 1983), a 20-item measure of trait or dispositional anxi-
ety (e.g., Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and
bothers me, I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put
them out of my mind, I worry too much over something that
really doesn’t matter). The STAI has been shown to exhibit high
internal-consistency reliability (α = 0.89) and test-retest stability
(r = 0.88; Barnes et al., 2002). The distribution of scores in the
present sample (M = 38.2, SD = 9.43, range of 20–53) was simi-
lar to published norms for mixed-sex undergraduate populations
(Spielberger et al., 1983).
WORKING MEMORY TASK
We used a lateralized change detection task to estimate the num-
ber of threat-related (i.e., fearful) and emotionally-neutral faces
stored in working memory, as indexed by the CDA. As detailed
below, the use of lateralized stimulus displays was mandated by
our focus on CDA (Figure 1; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004; Perez
and Vogel, 2012). The trial sequence was adapted from a report by
Sessa et al. (2011) and began with a fixation-cross (500ms). Next,
a pair of arrows indicating the to-be-remembered hemifield was
presented above and below the fixation-cross (200ms). Following
a brief interstimulus interval (200–400ms), an array of 2 or 4 faces
was presented (500ms). Participants were instructed to attend to
one or two target faces, which were surrounded by red (or yel-
low) borders in the cued hemifield, and to ignore distracter faces,
which were surrounded by yellow (or red) borders. The pairing
of colors with targets or distracters was counterbalanced across
participants.
CDA was quantified during the subsequent retention period
(900ms). This was followed by a probe array. Subjects
were instructed to make a response indicating whether or
not a target face had changed identity (equiprobable; but-
ton contingencies counterbalanced across subjects). The probe
array was presented until a response was registered. On
change trials, the identity of one of the target faces changed
while the expression remained invariant. The fixation-cross
was displayed during inter-trial intervals (800–1200ms). Set-
sizes of 1 and 2 were used because previous research has
shown that working memory capacity saturates at approxi-
mately 2 faces (Jackson and Raymond, 2008; Jackson et al.,
2009).
DESIGN
To assess the influence of expression and individual differ-
ences in anxiety on the ability to prevent task-irrelevant faces
from entering working memory, the task included conditions
in which threat-related distracters (1 Neutral Target and 1
Fear Distracter [NT1FD1]) or neutral distracters were present
(1 Neutral Target and 1 Neutral Distracter [NT1ND1]). These
conditions allowed us to calculate “filtering efficiency” scores
(detailed below; Jost et al., 2011), reflecting the degree of unnec-
essary storage, for each expression. To confirm that CDA was
sensitive to the number of faces retained in working mem-
ory, the task also included conditions in which set size was
varied and only task-relevant targets were presented (i.e., 1
Neutral Target [NT1], 2 Neutral Targets [NT2], 1 Fear Target
[FT1], 2 Fear Targets [FT2], and 1 Neutral Target paired with
1 Threat Target [NT1FT1]). Subjects completed 32 practice tri-
als before beginning the experimental trials, which included 180
trials/condition for a total of 1260 trials organized into twenty 63-
trial blocks. The condition order was pseudo-randomized across
blocks within-subjects.
FACE STIMULI
Face stimuli consisted of 52 black-and-white images (26 unique
models; half expressing fear) from the MacBrain Face Stimulus
Set (http://www.macbrain.org/faces) or Ekman and Friesen’s
(1976) set. Images were digitally manipulated to remove non-face
features (e.g., hair, clothing) and equate luminance. Faces were
presented in rectangular borders (2.4◦ wide × 2.8◦ tall) at a view-
ing distance of ∼65 cm. Both the memory array and probe array
contained faces that were placed in fixed locations surround-
ing a fixation cross. Horizontal distance between the face stimuli
and the fixation cross was 3◦. Vertical distance between top and
bottom face was 1.5◦.
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FIGURE 1 | Working memory task. Rows depict three key conditions from
the lateralized change detection (i.e., working memory) task (from top to
bottom: NT1, NT1FT1, NT1FD1). As detailed in the Methods section,
lateralized presentation was necessary for isolating contralateral delay activity
(CDA). Attention was directed to one hemifield by the arrow cues; identical
stimuli were presented in the uncued hemifield to control for non-specific
perceptual and preparatory motor activity when calculating CDA.
Delay-spanning CDA was extracted from the 900ms delay epoch. For ease of
interpretation, the schematic is not to scale. Portions of this figure were
reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd.: Nature Reviews
Neuroscience (Houdé and Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003; Peelen and Downing,
2007).
ERP DATA ACQUISITION AND PREPROCESSING
ERPs were recorded using a DC amplifier and a 32-channel
cap with shielded leads (Advanced Neuro Technology B.V.,
Netherlands) referenced to the left mastoid. Impedances were
kept below 10 k. Data were low-pass filtered (∼69.12Hz) and
sampled at 256Hz. The vertical electrooculogram (VEOG) was
measured using a pair of bipolar-referenced electrodes placed
above and below the right eye. The horizontal electrooculogram
was recorded using a pair of bipolar-referenced electrodes placed
1 cm from the outer canthi of the eyes.
Offline, ERP data were re-referenced (mean of the left and
right mastoids), filtered (Butterworth band-pass of 0.1–30Hz;
24db/octave), segmented (–200 to 1400ms from the onset of the
target array), and baseline-corrected (200ms). Because the CDA
critically depends on lateralized visual processing, we elected to
reject all trials in which there was evidence that subjects failed to
attend to the center of the visual field, rather than use artifact-
correction algorithms that could potentially mask shifts in visual
attention (Shackman et al., 2009; McMenamin et al., 2010, 2011).
Accordingly, trials where VEOG exceeded ±80μV and/or other
channels exceeded ±60μV were automatically rejected. Nine
subjects with excessive artifact (>35% trials) were excluded from
analyses, consistent with other studies using similar tasks (e.g.,
Sessa et al., 2011). For the remaining subjects, an average of
79.87% (SD = 0.08) of trials were retained. Importantly, the
retained and excluded subjects did not significantly differ in either
the mean level of dispositional anxiety or estimated working
memory capacity, ts < 0.68, ps > 0.51.
CDA
To isolate CDA, contralateral waveforms were created by aver-
aging the activity recorded in the left hemisphere when attend-
ing to cued stimuli in the right visual field, and activity over
the right hemisphere when attending to cued stimuli in the
left visual field. Ipsilateral waveforms were created by averag-
ing the activity recorded in the left hemisphere when attending
to uncued stimuli in the left visual field, and activity over the
right hemisphere when attending to uncued stimuli in the right
visual field (see Figure 1). CDA was calculated as the difference
between contralateral and ipsilateral activity during the retention
interval (500–900ms; Figure 1). In contrast to other neurophys-
iological measures of delay-spanning activity, these procedures
for isolating CDA have the advantage of removing nonspecific
perceptual (i.e., elicited by physically-identical stimuli in the
uncued visual field) and motor preparatory activity (Vogel and
Machizawa, 2004; Vogel et al., 2005). Averaged waveforms were
created for each condition and hemisphere using electrode clus-
ters (P3/4, P7/8, O1/2, and T7/8). Consistent with prior work,
error trials were excluded when calculating CDA for the condi-
tions in which only targets were presented (Vogel et al., 2005),
but were not excluded when calculating CDA for the condi-
tions in which a mixture of targets and distracters was presented
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(Lee et al., 2010). Error trials were used for the mixed condi-
tions because decrements in performance likely reflect the storage
of distracters in working memory (Lee et al., 2010). For visu-
alization purposes, grand averaged waveforms were low-pass
filtered (10Hz).
CONFIRMATORY ANALYSES
To confirm that task-relevant threat-related targets are associated
with enhanced storage (Sessa et al., 2011) and that larger target
arrays (i.e., set sizes) are associated with increased working mem-
ory storage, we performed a series of analyses using CDA, as well
as behavioral estimates of working memory capacity and reac-
tion time (RT). Working memory capacity was estimated using
Pashler’s (1988) formula: K = S × (H − FA)/(1 − FA), where K
is the estimated number of items maintained in WM, S is the set-
size of the memory array, H is the hit-rate, and FA is the false
alarm rate. Pashler’s K was used because it was developed for
working memory tasks using whole-display probes; whereas the
more commonly used Cowan’s K (Cowan, 2001) was developed
for single-probe displays (see Rouder et al., 2011 for a detailed
discussion). Analyses were performed using SPSS (version 18.0.0;
IBM Inc., Armonk, NY).
HYPOTHESIS TESTING (FILTERING EFFICIENCY)
To test whether dispositionally anxious individuals fail to regu-
late threat’s access to working memory, CDA “filtering efficiency”
scores (Jost et al., 2011) were separately computed for the threat
and neutral distracter conditions. Filtering efficiency for threat-
related distracters was calculated as the difference in amplitude
between trials in which two targets were presented (1 Neutral
Target and 1 Fear Target [NT1FT1]) and physically-identical tri-
als in which a neutral target was paired with a fear distracter
(NT1FD1). Because CDA is a negative-going potential, difference
scores were scaled by −1 to aid interpretation. An efficiency of
zero indicates a complete failure of filtering (i.e., equivalent stor-
age of two targets compared to the combination of a target and a
threat-related distracter). Likewise, filtering efficiency for neutral
distracters was calculated as the difference in amplitude between
trials in which two neutral targets (NT2) were presented and tri-
als in which a neutral target was paired with a neutral distracter
(NT1ND1) (scaled by –1).
Hypothesis testing on relations between dispositional anxiety
(i.e., STAI) and filtering efficiency was performed using a series
of regressions. A single outlier was excluded from the analyses
of neutral filtering efficiency. Results were similar with the out-
lier included (not reported). To assess the specificity of relations
between dispositional anxiety and CDA filtering efficiency, we
computed additional regressions controlling for nuisance varia-
tion in mean-centered age, sex, and maximum working memory
capacity (i.e., the maximal Pashler’sK across any of the five “pure”
target conditions). Robust regressions, which minimize the influ-
ence of outlying observations (e.g., Shackman et al., in press;
Wager et al., 2005), yielded equivalent results. Although hypoth-
esis testing focused on CDA filtering efficiency, exploratory anal-
yses of RT filtering efficiency were also performed. RT filtering
efficiency was computed using the same formulas described for
CDA, but without the −1 scalar.
RESULTS
THREAT-RELATED TARGETS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH ENHANCED
STORAGE
As a precursor to hypothesis testing, we examined the influence
of threat on working memory storage when it is task-relevant.
Consistent with previous research (Sessa et al., 2011), task-
relevant threat targets (FT1, FT2) were associated with enhanced
storage compared to emotionally-neutral targets (NT1, NT2),
evidenced by enhanced CDA, increased K, and slower responses
(Fs(1, 23) > 6, ps < 0.03; Figure 2 and Table 1). As expected,
larger target arrays were associated with increased storage, as
indexed by the same three measures (Fs(1, 23) > 6.3; ps < 0.03).
INEFFICIENT FILTERING OF THREAT-RELATED DISTRACTERS
Threat-related distracters gained unnecessary access to working
memory, as indexed by increased CDA amplitude for the threat-
distracter condition (NT1FD1) compared to a single neutral tar-
get (NT1), t(23) = 2.40, p = 0.03 (Figure 3). On average, subjects
were able to filter threat-related distracters, albeit inefficiently.
Specifically, the amplitude of CDA was significantly smaller for
the threat-distracter condition (NT1FD1) compared to those in
which two targets were presented (NT1FT1), t(23) = −3.61; p =
0.001. Unlike threat, neutral-distracters were efficiently filtered;
CDA amplitude did not differ between the neutral-distracter
(NT1ND1) and single target conditions (NT1), t(23) = 1.4; p =
0.18 (Figure 3) but was significantly smaller than the two neutral
target condition (NT2), t(23) = −2.61, p = 0.02.
ANXIOUS INDIVIDUALS FAIL TO FILTER THREAT-RELATED
DISTRACTERS
To test whether anxious individuals exhibit difficulties gating
threat-related distracters from working memory, we used the
CDA to compute filtering efficiency scores (see the Methods
section; Jost et al., 2011). An efficiency of zero indicates a
complete failure of filtering, that is, comparable levels of stor-
age in the physically-identical distracter and two-target condi-
tions. Analyses of CDA filtering efficiency demonstrated that
anxious individuals were less efficient at preventing threat-
related distracters from gaining access to working memory,
R2 = 0.24, p < 0.03 (Figure 4). Similar effects were obtained
after controlling for nuisance variation in age, sex, and maxi-
mum working memory capacity (partial R2 > 0.31, p < 0.01)
or the number of artifact-free trials contributing to the CDA
analyses (partial R2 = 0.20, p = 0.03). Dispositional anxiety was
unrelated to the efficiency of filtering emotionally-neutral dis-
tracters (R2 < 0.01, p > 0.05). To confirm that our results were
not unduly influenced by outlying values, we recomputed the
key analyses using robust regression techniques. This revealed
nearly identical results: higher levels of dispositional anxiety pre-
dicted reduced efficiency for filtering threat-related distracters
(R2 = 0.25, p < 0.01), but not neutral distracters (R2 < 0.01,
p > 0.05).
Likewise, dispositional anxiety did not predict CDA ampli-
tude when threat-related targets were relevant (FT1 and FT2)
to the task, R2 < 0.02, p > 0.05. Consistent with these results,
anxiety significantly predicted threat filtering efficiency after con-
trolling for either variation in neutral filtering efficiency or
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FIGURE 2 | Task-relevant threat targets are associated with enhanced
storage. Means are collapsed across set-size (NT1/NT2 and FT1/FT2).
Contralateral delay activity (CDA) waveforms (panel A). Mean CDA amplitude
was extracted using the entire delay interval (500–1400ms; gray box). Threat
(red) was associated with increased CDA amplitude (panel B), working
memory capacity (panel C), and reaction time (RT; panel D) compared to
neutral (blue). Asterisks denote significant pairwise mean differences
(p < 0.05). Error bars indicate the nominal probability of the null hypothesis
being rejected by chance: p < 0.05 (non-overlapping bars) or p > 0.05
(overlapping bars). Bars were computed as described in Shackman et al.
(2010). Note that for CDA results, negative is plotted up corresponding to
increased amplitude.
Table 1 | Means and standard deviations for accuracy, working
memory capacity (K ), and reaction time (in milliseconds) for each
condition.
Condition Accuracy
(proportion
correct)
Working
memory
capacity (K )
RT (ms)
1 Neutral target 0.83 (0.10) 0.74 (0.17) 900.65 (179.42)
2 Neutral targets 0.66 (0.07) 0.78 (0.35) 1108.33 (268.45)
1 Fear target 0.86 (0.09) 0.79 (0.16) 976.05 (209.37)
2 Fear targets 0.70 (0.07) 0.96 (0.32) 1139.68 (260.42)
1 Neutral target and
1 Fear target
0.69 (0.08) 0.92 (0.34) 1104.41 (251.72)
1 Neutral target and
1 Fear distracter
0.80 (0.11) 0.70 (0.19) 995.99 (215.20)
1 Neutral target and
1 Neutral distracter
0.79 (0.10) 0.69 (0.17) 993.00 (187.31)
the CDA associated with task-relevant threat targets (partial
R2 > 0.24, ps < 0.05). Exploratory analyses of RT filtering effi-
ciency revealed a similar pattern. Specifically, higher levels of
dispositional anxiety predicted reduced filtering efficiency for
threat-related (R2 = 0.22, p = 0.02), but not neutral distracters
(R2 < 0.01, p > 0.05). Maximum working memory capacity did
not predict filtering efficiency for either the threat or neutral
distracter conditions (R2s < 0.03, ps < 0.05), likely reflecting
the rather limited variation in capacity for faces (Jackson and
Raymond, 2008; Jackson et al., 2009; Sessa et al., 2011).
DISCUSSION
The present results provide compelling new evidence that dis-
positionally anxious individuals allocate unnecessary working
memory storage to threat-related cues when they are irrel-
evant to the task at hand. This effect was not evident for
emotionally-neutral distracters and could not be explained by
individual differences in working memory capacity, the size of
the CDA evoked by task-relevant threat targets, or the effi-
ciency of filtering emotionally-neutral distracters. Parallel results
were obtained for RT. Taken together these data indicate that
dispositional anxiety is associated with a specific deficit in pre-
venting threat-related distracters from gaining access to working
memory. These results reinforce work emphasizing the impor-
tance of cognitive control deficits in anxiety and mood dis-
orders (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck and Derakshan, 2011;
Owens et al., 2012). More generally, our results provide a
novel neurobiological framework for conceptualizing the neural
mechanisms that underlie the intrusive thoughts and maladap-
tive actions characteristic of anxious individuals when threat is
absent.
Our findings demonstrate that anxiety is associated with
inefficient gating of threat-related distracters from working
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FIGURE 3 | Threat-related distracters were inefficiently filtered from
working memory, as indexed by contralateral delay activity (CDA).
(A) Threat distracters. Mean CDA amplitude was significantly increased (i.e.,
more negative) on trials with a threat-related distracter (red bar) (NT1FD1)
compared to those with a single neutral target (light gray) (NT1). On average,
subjects were able to filter threat-related distracters, albeit inefficiently; mean
CDA amplitude was significantly decreased on trials with a threat-related
distracter (NT1FD1) compared to those with two physically-matched targets
(dark gray) (NT1FT1). CDA waveforms for the three conditions are shown at
the bottom. Mean CDA amplitude was extracted using the entire delay
interval (500–1400ms; gray box). (B) Neutral distracters. Mean CDA
amplitude was not significantly increased on trials with a neutral distracter
(blue bar) (NT1ND1) compared to those with a single neutral target (light gray)
(NT1). Asterisks denote significant pairwise mean differences (p < 0.05).
Error bars indicate the nominal probability of the null hypothesis being
rejected by chance: p < 0.05 (non-overlapping bars) or p > 0.05 (overlapping
bars). Bars were computed as described in Shackman et al. (2010). Note that
negative potentials are plotted up corresponding to increased CDA amplitude.
memory, but they do not directly address the neural mechanisms
underlying this deficit. Prior work using simple geometric stim-
uli suggests that CDA reflects the activity of a capacity-limited
buffer instantiated in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; Todd
and Marois, 2004, 2005; Xu and Chun, 2006). Presently, the spe-
cific neural mechanisms underlying anxious individuals’ inability
to adequately gate threat’s access to this buffer remain unknown.
Our results are compatible with alterations in any of three distinct
functional circuits. A key challenge for future research will be to
directly test these hypotheses.
One possibility is that the unnecessary storage of threat-
related distracters in PPC reflects the amygdala’s influence on the
visual cortical regions responsible for processing threat-related
cues, such as the faces used in our study. Among anxious and
behaviorally inhibited individuals, the amygdala is more reac-
tive to potential threat (Schwartz et al., 2003; Etkin and Wager,
2007; Blackford et al., 2012). The amygdala is poised to bias
attention to threat via excitatory projections to the visual cor-
tex (Vuilleumier et al., 2004; Freese and Amaral, 2009). Indeed,
functional connectivity between these two regions is increased
when attending to threat cues (Noesselt et al., 2005; Mohanty
et al., 2009) and threat-induced recruitment of the amygdala
precedes enhanced activation of visual cortex (Sabatinelli et al.,
2009; Pourtois et al., in press). Variation in amygdala activa-
tion also predicts the reorienting of attention to threat-related
cues (Gamer and Büchel, 2009) and the trial-by-trial detection
of threat—an effect mediated by activation in the visual cortex
(Lim et al., 2009). Collectively, these data suggest that difficul-
ties regulating threat’s access to working memory could be a
downstream consequence of anxious individuals’ bias to over-
allocate covert and overt attention to threat (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007).
A second possibility is that the unnecessary occupation of
working memory by threat reflects problems monitoring the
competition between targets and threat-distracters for attention.
Adjudication of this competition is thought to depend upon
conflict-monitoring processes instantiated in the midcingulate
cortex (MCC; Botvinick, 2007; Shackman et al., 2011). When
conflict is detected in the MCC, it triggers prefrontal regula-
tory signals aimed at biasing competition to favor task-relevant
cues over potential sources of distraction, such as the threat-
distracters used in the present study (Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Etkin et al., 2010). These biasing signals could be directed at the
visual cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001) or the amygdala (Etkin
et al., 2011). At present, it remains unclear whether anxious indi-
viduals are less efficient at monitoring threat-related conflicts
(Bishop et al., 2004; Etkin et al., 2010; Shackman et al., under
review).
A third possibility is that anxious individuals’ bias to allo-
cate unnecessary storage to threat-distracters reflects a gating
deficit. Consistent with recent computational models (Frank and
O’Reilly, 2006; Moustafa et al., 2008; Wiecki and Frank, 2010),
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FIGURE 4 | Dispositionally anxious individuals are inefficient at
filtering threat distracters, as indexed by contralateral delay activity
(CDA). (A) Threat-related distracters. (B) Neutral distracters. A filtering
efficiency of zero (broken gray line) indicates a complete failure of filtering
(i.e., comparable levels of storage in the distracter and two-target
conditions, NT1FT1—NT1FD1 and NT2-NT1ND1).
the basal ganglia and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)
exhibit gating-like signals that are associated with reduced
distracter-evoked activity in visual cortex and reduced storage of
distracters in the PPC (Postle, 2005; McNab and Klingberg, 2008;
Suzuki and Gottlieb, 2013) during emotionally-neutral work-
ing memory tasks. Furthermore, patients with lesions involving
the basal ganglia (i.e., left putamen) show selective deficits in
gating distracters when performing emotionally-neutral working
memory tasks (Baier et al., 2010). Whether similar mechanisms
support the regulation of threat-related or other emotionally-
salient distracters is unknown. Nevertheless, robust projections
from the amygdala to the basal ganglia (Freese and Amaral, 2009)
suggest one way in which high levels of dispositional anxiety could
promote threat’s access to working memory. Functional interac-
tions between the amygdala and dlPFC could provide an alternate
pathway (Lim et al., 2009).
From a translational perspective, our results provide a frame-
work for conceptualizing the intrusive and distressing thoughts,
worries, and memories that are a central feature of anxiety
and mood disorders, including generalized anxiety, obsessive
compulsive, posttraumatic stress, and major depressive disorders
(Beck et al., 2005; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). High levels
of dispositional anxiety are associated with a similar pattern of
dysregulated cognition (e.g., Eysenck, 1984; Eysenck and van
Berkum, 1992). Inefficient filtering of threat-related information
from working memory potentially explains many of these fea-
tures. That is, once it resides in working memory, threat-related
information could continue to elicit distress and maladaptively
bias attention and action after it is no longer present in the
external environment.
Importantly, this framework also provides a potential mech-
anistic explanation for the intrusive, distressing memories that
are a hallmark of both dispositional anxiety and many dis-
orders on the internalizing spectrum (Krueger and Markon,
2006). In particular, it has become clear that items can enter
working memory via either perceptual encoding, as with the
threat-related distracters used in the present study, or retrieval
from long-term memory (Jonides et al., 2008). From this per-
spective, working memory reflects the temporary activation
of recently perceived items or the temporary re-activation of
representations stored in long-term memory (Oberauer, 2002;
Jonides et al., 2008; Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012). This suggests
that intrusive memories, such as those prominent in post-
traumatic stress disorder, could result from problems preventing
distressing long-term memories from gaining access to working
memory.
On the basis of the present results and other data, we have
proposed that the maladaptive profile of thoughts and behav-
iors exhibited by anxious individuals in the absence of overt
threat could reflect a more fundamental deficit in controlling
threat’s access to working memory. Although it is clear that
much work remains, this hypothesis provides a clear roadmap
to the most fruitful avenues for understanding the neurocog-
nitive mechanisms underlying these symptoms. In particular,
as with any preliminary study, it will be important to repli-
cate our findings using a larger sample (Yarkoni, 2009). Given
that our conclusions were based on a convenience sample, it
will be essential to test our hypothesis in high-risk and patient
populations and to directly assess the degree to which threat-
related filtering efficiency predicts differences in the severity or
frequency of distressing thoughts and maladaptive behaviors. It
may be that the presentation of gating deficits differs across
internalizing disorders (Owens et al., 2012). Methodologically,
it will be important to develop improved procedures for min-
imizing ocular artifacts, which led to substantial attrition in
the present study and in other studies using similar paradigms
(Sessa et al., 2011). Extending our approach to incorporate sim-
pler cues (e.g., color patches or oriented bars) that have been
aversively-conditioned may prove helpful in this regard and
would have the added benefit of increasing integration with the
large body of cognitive neuroscience research and theory devel-
oped around such stimuli (see Owens et al., 2012 for a related
application).
Dispositional anxiety is an important risk factor for the devel-
opment of anxiety, depressive, and other psychiatric disorders.
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The present study provides novel evidence that dispositional anx-
iety reflects a failure to adequately regulate the access of threat
to working memory, the capacity-limited workspace that under-
lies adaptive, goal-directed behavior. These results set the stage
for a more detailed understanding of the distressing thoughts
and memories that afflict anxious individuals when threat is
absent—a defining, but poorly understood feature of the internal-
izing spectrum of disorders. Future research aimed at clarifying
the neural underpinnings of this regulatory deficit promises to
enhance our understanding of the mechanisms that confer risk
for the development of psychopathology.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Daniel M. Stout conceptualized the study. Daniel M. Stout,
Christine L. Larson, and Alexander J. Shackman designed the
study. Daniel M. Stout collected data and performed data
processing. Daniel M. Stout analyzed data. Daniel M. Stout,
Alexander J. Shackman, and Christine L. Larson contributed to
data interpretation. Daniel M. Stout and Alexander J. Shackman
wrote the paper. Alexander J. Shackman and Daniel M. Stout
created the figures and table. Christine L. Larson supervised the
study. All authors contributed to revising the paper.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank all of the research assistants in the Affective
Neuroscience Laboratory at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee for assistance in data collection. This research was
partially supported by the American Psychological Foundation
COGDOP Graduate Research Scholarship to Daniel M. Stout
Portions of this data was presented at the 2012 annual meet-
ing of the Society for Psychophysiological Research. We thank
two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions in improving this
manuscript. Development of the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set was
overseen by Nim Tottenham and supported by the John D and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Early
Experience and Brain Development.
REFERENCES
Baddeley, A. (2012). Working memory:
theories, models, and controversies.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 63, 1–29.
Baier, B., Karnath, H., Dieterich, M.,
Birklein, F., Heinze, C., and Müller,
N. G. (2010). Keeping memory
clear and stable – the contribution
of human basal ganglia and pre-
frontal cortex to working memory.
J. Neurosci. 30, 9788–9792.
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin,
L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M., and
van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2007).
Threat-related attentional bias in
anxious and nonanxious individu-
als: a meta-analytic study. Psychol.
Bull. 133, 1–24.
Barnes, L. L. B., Harp, D., and
Jung, W. S. (2002). Reliability
generalization of scores on the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory. Educ. Psychol. Meas. 62,
603–618.
Beck, A. T., Emery, G., and Greenberg,
R. L. (2005). Anxiety Disorders and
Phobias: A Cognitive Perspective.
Cambridge, MA: Basic Books.
Berggren, N., and Derakshan, N. (in
press). Attentional control deficits
in trait anxiety: why you see them
and why you don’t. Biol. Psychol.
Bishop, S. (2007). Neurocognitive
mechanisms of anxiety: an integra-
tive account. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11,
307–316.
Bishop, S. (2008). Neural mechanisms
underlying selective attention to
threat. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1129,
141–152.
Bishop, S., Duncan, J., Brett, M., and
Lawrence, A. D. (2004). Prefrontal
cortical function and anxiety: con-
trolling attention to threat-related
stimuli. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 184–188.
Bishop, S. J., Jenkins, R., and Lawrence,
A. D. (2007). Neural processing
of fearful faces: effects of anxi-
ety are gated by perceptual capac-
ity limitations. Cereb. Cortex 17,
1595–1603.
Blackford, J. U., Allen, A. H., Cowan,
R. L., and Avery, S. N. (2012).
Amygdala and hippocampus fail
to habituate to faces in individ-
uals with an inhibited tempera-
ment. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 8,
143–150.
Blackford, J. U., and Pine, D. S. (2012).
Neural substrates of childhood anx-
iety disorders: a review of neu-
roimaging findings. Child Adolesc.
Psychiatr. Clin. N. Am. 21, 501–525.
Botvinick, M. (2007). Conflict mon-
itoring and decision making:
reconciling two perspectives
on anterior cingulate function.
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 7,
356–366.
Cisler, J. M., and Koster, E. H. W.
(2010). Mechanisms of attentional
biases towards threat in anxiety dis-
orders: an integrative review. Clin.
Psychol. Rev. 30, 203–216.
Clauss, J. A., and Blackford, J. U.
(2012). Behavioral inhibition
and risk for developing social
anxiety disorder: a meta-analytic
study. J. Am. Acad. Child Adolesc.
Psychiatry 51, 1066–1075.
Collins, P. Y., Patel, V., Joestl, S. S.,
March, D., Insel, T. R., Daar, A. S.,
et al. (2011). Grand challenges in
global mental health. Nature 475,
27–30.
Cowan, N. (2001). Themagical number
4 in short-term memory: a recon-
sideration of mental storage capac-
ity. Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 87–114.
discussion: 114–185.
Cowan, N. (2005). Working Memory
Capacity. Hove, East Sussex:
Psychology Press.
D’Ardenne, K., Eshel, N., Luka, J.,
Lenartowicz, A., Nystrom, L. E.,
and Cohen, J. D. (2012). Role of
prefrontal cortex and the midbrain
dopamine system in working mem-
ory updating. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 109, 19900–19909.
Davis, M., and Whalen, P. J. (2001).
The amygdala: vigilance and emo-
tion. Mol. Psychiatry 6, 13–34.
Ekman, P., and Friesen, W. V. (1976).
Pictures of Facial Affect. Palo Alto,
CA: Consulting Psychologists.
Etkin, A., Egner, T., and Kalisch, R.
(2011). Emotional processing in
anterior cingulate and medial pre-
frontal cortex. Trends Cogn. Sci. 15,
85–93.
Etkin, A., Prater, K. E., Hoeft, F.,
Menon, V., and Schatzberg, A.
F. (2010). Failure of anterior
cingulate activation and connec-
tivity with the amygdala during
implicit regulation of emotional
processing in generalized anxiety
disorder. Am. J. Psychiatry 167,
545–554.
Etkin, A., Prater, K. E., Schatzberg,
A. F., Menon, V., and Greicius, M.
(2009). Disrupted amygdalar sub-
region functional connectivity and
evidence of a compensatory net-
work in generalized anxiety dis-
order. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 66,
1361–1372.
Etkin, A., and Wager, T. D. (2007).
Functional neuroimaging of
anxiety: a meta-analysis of emo-
tional processing in PTSD, social
anxiety disorder, and specific
phobia. Am. J. Psychiatry 164,
1476–1488.
Eysenck, M. W. (1984). Anxiety and the
worry process. Bull. Psychon. Soc.
22, 545–548.
Eysenck, M. W., and Derakshan, N.
(2011). New perspectives in atten-
tional control theory. Pers. Indivd.
Dif. 50, 955–960.
Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos,
R., and Calvo, M. (2007). Anxiety
and cognitive performance: the
attentional control theory. Emotion
7, 336–353.
Eysenck, M. W., and van Berkum,
J. J. A. (1992). Trait anxiety,
defensiveness, and the structure
of worry. Pers. Individ. Dif. 13,
1285–1290.
Frank, M. J., and O’Reilly, R. C. (2006).
A mechanistic account of striatal
dopamine function in human
cognition: psychopharmacologi-
cal studies with cabergoline and
haloperidol. Behav. Neurosci. 120,
497–517.
Freese, J., and Amaral, D. (2009).
“Neuroanatomy of the pri-
mate amygdala,” in The Human
Amygdala, eds P. Whalen and E.
Phelps (New York, NY: Guilford),
3–42.
Gamer, M., and Büchel, C. (2009).
Amygdala activation predicts gaze
toward fearful eyes. J. Neurosci. 29,
9123–9126.
Goldman-Rakic, P. (1996). Regional
and cellular fractionation of work-
ing memory. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 93, 13473–13480.
Hofmann, S. G., Ellard, K. K.,
and Siegle, G. J. (2012).
Neurobiological correlates of
cognitions in fear and anxi-
ety: a cognitive–neurobiological
information-processing model.
Cogn. Emot. 26, 282–299.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 58 | 8
Stout et al. Anxiety and working memory
Houdé, O., and Tzourio-Mazoyer, N.
(2003). Neural foundations of log-
ical and mathematical cognition.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 507–514.
Ikkai, A., McCollough, A. W., and
Vogel, E. K. (2010). Contralateral
delay activity provides a neural mea-
sure of the number of represen-
tations in visual working memory.
J. Neurophysiol. 103, 1963–1968.
Jackson, M. C., and Raymond, J. E.
(2008). Familiarity enhances visual
working memory for faces. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 34,
556–568.
Jackson, M. C., Wu, C., Linden, D.
E. J., and Raymond, J. E. (2009).
Enhanced visual short-term
memory for angry faces. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 35,
363–374.
Jonides, J., Lewis, R. L., Nee, D. E.,
Lustig, C. A., Berman, M. G.,
and Moore, K. S. (2008). The
mind and brain of short-term
memory. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59,
193–224.
Jost, K., Bryck, R. L., Vogel, E. K.,
and Mayr, U. (2011). Are old
adults just like low working mem-
ory young adults? Filtering effi-
ciency and age differences in visual
working memory. Cereb. Cortex 21,
1147–1154.
Kessler, R. C., Petukhova, M., Sampson,
N. A., Zaslavsky, A. M., and
Wittchen, H. (2012). Twelve-month
and lifetime prevalence and lifetime
morbid risk of anxiety and mood
disorders in the United States.
Int. J. Methods Psychiatr. Res. 21,
169–184.
Kotov, R., Gamez, W., Schmidt, F., and
Watson, D. (2010). Linking “big”
personality traits to anxiety, depres-
sive, and substance use disorders:
a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 136,
768–821.
Krueger, R. F., and Markon, K. E.
(2006). Reinterpreting comor-
bidity: a model-based approach
to understanding and classifying
psychopathology. Annu. Rev. Clin.
Psychol. 2, 111–133.
Lahey, B. B. (2009). Public health
significance of neuroticism. Am.
Psychol. 64, 241–256.
Lee, E., Cowan, N., Vogel, E. K., Rolan,
T., Valle-Inclán, F., and Hackley, S.
A. (2010). Visual working memory
deficits in patients with Parkinson’s
disease are due to both reduced stor-
age capacity and impaired ability
to filter out irrelevant information.
Brain 133, 2677–2689.
Lewis-Peacock, J., Drysdale, A. T.,
Oberauer, K., and Postle, B. R.
(2012). Neural evidence for a
distinction between short-term
memory and the focus of attention.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 24, 61–79.
Lim, S., Padmala, S., and Pessoa,
L. (2009). Segregating the signif-
icant from the mundane on a
moment-to-moment basis via direct
and indirect amygdala contribu-
tions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
106, 16841–16846.
MacLeod, C., and Mathews, A.
(2012). Cognitive bias modification
approaches to anxiety. Annu. Rev.
Clin. Psychol. 8, 189–217.
McCollough, A. W., Machizawa,
M. G., and Vogel, E. K. (2007).
Electrophysiological measures of
maintaining representations in
visual working memory. Cortex 43,
77–94.
McMenamin, B. W., Shackman, A. J.,
Greischar, L. L., and Davidson, R.
J. (2011). Electromyogenic arti-
facts and electroencephalographic
inferences revisited. Neuroimage
54, 4–9.
McMenamin, B. W., Shackman, A. J.,
Maxwell, J. S., Bachhuber, D. R. W.,
Koppenhaver, A. M., Greischar, L.
L., et al. (2010). Validation of ICA-
based myogenic artifact correction
for scalp and source-localized EEG.
Neuroimage 49, 2416–2432.
McNab, F., and Klingberg, T. (2008).
Prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia
control access to working memory.
Nat. Neurosci. 11, 103–107.
Miller, E. K., and Cohen, J. D. (2001).
An integrative theory of pre-
frontal cortex function. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci. 24, 167–202.
Mohanty, A., Egner, T., Monti, J.
M., and Mesulam, M. M. (2009).
Search for a threatening target
triggers limbic guidance of spa-
tial attention. J. Neurosci. 29,
10563–10572.
Moustafa, A. A., Sherman, S. J., and
Frank, M. J. (2008). A dopamin-
ergic basis for working memory,
learning and attentional shifting in
Parkinsonism. Neuropsychologia 46,
3144–3156.
Noesselt, T., Driver, J., Heinze, H. J.,
and Dolan, R. (2005). Asymmetrical
activation in the human brain dur-
ing processing of fearful faces. Curr.
Biol. 15, 424–429.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B., and
Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking
rumination. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 3,
400–424.
Oberauer, K. (2002). Access to infor-
mation in working memory: explor-
ing the focus of attention. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 28,
411–421.
Owens, M., Koster, E. H. W., and
Derakshan, N. (2012). Impaired
filtering of irrelevant information
in dysphoria: an ERP study.
Psychophysiology 7, 752–763.
Pashler, H. (1988). Familiarity and
visual change detection. Percept.
Psychophys. 44, 369–378.
Peelen, M. V., and Downing, P. E.
(2007). The neural basis of visual
body perception. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
8, 636–648.
Perez, V. B., and Vogel, E. K. (2012).
“What ERPs can tell us about
working memory,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Event-Related Potential
Components, eds S. J. Luck and
E. S. Kappenman (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press),
361–372.
Postle, B. R. (2005). Delay-period activ-
ity in the prefrontal cortex: one
function is sensory gating. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 17, 1679–1690.
Postle, B. R. (2006). Working mem-
ory as an emergent property of the
mind and brain. Neuroscience 139,
23–38.
Pourtois, G., Schettino, A., and
Vuilleumier, P. (in press). Brain
mechanisms for emotional influ-
ences on perception and attention:
what is magic and what is not. Biol.
Psychol.
Rouder, J., Morey, R., Morey, C.,
and Cowan, N. (2011). How to
measure working memory capacity
in the change detection paradigm.
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 18, 324–330.
Sabatinelli, D., Lang, P. L., Bradley, M.
M., Costa, V. D., and Keil, A. (2009).
The timing of emotional discrimi-
nation in human amygdala and ven-
tral visual cortex. J. Neurosci. 29,
14864–14868.
Sareen, J., Cox, B. J., Afifi, T. O., de
Graaf, R., Asmundson, G. J., ten
Have, M., et al. (2005). Anxiety
disorders and risk for suicidal
ideation and suicide attempts:
a population-based longitudi-
nal study of adults. Arch. Gen.
Psychiatry 62, 1249–1257.
Schwartz, C. E., Wright, C. I., Shin,
L. M., Kagen, J., and Rauch, S. L.
(2003). Inhibited and uninhibited
infants “Grown up”: adult amyg-
dalar response to novelty. Science
300, 1952–1953.
Sessa, P., Luria, R., Gotler, A., Jolicœur,
P., and Dell’Acqua, R. (2011).
Interhemispheric ERP asymme-
tries over inferior parietal cortex
reveal differential visual working
memory maintenance for fearful
versus neutral facial identities.
Psychophysiology 48, 187–197.
Shackman, A. J., Fox, A. S., Oler, J.
A., Shelton, S. E., Davidson, R.
J., and Kalin, N. H. (in press).
Neural mechanisms underlying het-
erogeneity in the presentation of
anxious temperament. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
Shackman, A. J., McMenamin, B.
W., Maxwell, J. S., Greischar, L.
L., and Davidson, R. J. (2010).
Identifying robust and sensitive
frequency bands for interrogating
neural oscillations. Neuroimage 51,
1319–1333.
Shackman, A. J., McMenamin, B.
W., Slagter, H. A., Maxwell, J. S.,
Greischar, L. L., and Davidson, R.
J. (2009). Electromyogenic arti-
facts and electroencephalographic
inferences. Brain Topogr. 21, 7–12.
Shackman, A. J., Salomons, T. V.,
Slagter, H. A., Fox, A. S., Winter, J.
J., and Davidson, R. J. (2011). The
integration of negative affect, pain
and cognitive control in the cingu-
late cortex. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 12,
154–167.
Shechner, T., Britton, J. C., Pérez-Edgar,
K., Bar-Haim, Y., Ernst, M., Fox, N.
A., et al. (2012). Attention biases,
anxiety, and development: toward
or away from threats or rewards?
Depress. Anxiety 29, 282–294.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L.,
Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., and Jacobs,
G. A. (1983). Manual for the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto,
CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Suzuki, M., and Gottlieb, J. (2013).
Distinct neural mechanisms of dis-
tractor suppression in the frontal
and parietal lobe. Nat. Neurosci. 16,
98–104.
Taylor, S., Abramowitz, J. S., and
McKay, D. (2012). Non-adherence
and non-response in the treat-
ment of anxiety disorders. J. Anxiety
Disord. 26, 583–589.
Thiruchselvam, R., Hajcak, G., and
Gross, J. J. (2012). Looking inward:
shifting attention within working
memory representations alters emo-
tional responses. Psychol. Sci. 23,
1461–1466.
Todd, J. J., and Marois, R. (2004).
Capacity limit of visual short-term
memory in human posterior pari-
etal cortex. Nature 428, 751–754.
Todd, J. J., and Marois, R. (2005).
Posterior parietal cortex activity
predicts individual differences in
visual short-term memory capac-
ity. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 5,
144–155.
Vogel, E. K., and Machizawa, M.
G. (2004). Neural activity pre-
dicts individual differences in visual
working memory capacity. Nature
428, 748–751.
Vogel, E. K., McCollough, A. W., and
Machizawa, M. G. (2005). Neural
measures reveal individual differ-
ences in controlling access to work-
ing memory. Nature 438, 500–503.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 58 | 9
Stout et al. Anxiety and working memory
Voytek, B., and Knight, R. T.
(2010). Prefrontal cortex and
basal ganglia contributions to
visual working memory. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107,
18167–18172.
Vuilleumier, P., Richardson, M. P.,
Armony, J. L., Driver, J., and Dolan,
R. J. (2004). Distant influences
of amygdala lesion on visual
cortical activation during emotional
face processing. Nat. Neurosci. 7,
1271–1278.
Wager, T. D., Keller, M. C., Lacey, S.
C., and Jonides, J. (2005). Increased
sensitivity in neuroimaging analyses
using robust regression. Neuroimage
26, 99–113.
Wiecki, T. V., and Frank, M. J. (2010).
Neurocomputational models of
motor and cognitive deficits in
Parkinson’s disease. Prog. Brain Res.
183, 275–297.
Whalen, P. J. (1998). Fear, vigilance,
and ambiguity: initial neuroimag-
ing studies of the human amygdala.
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 7, 177–188.
Xu, Y., and Chun, M. M. (2006).
Dissociable neural mechanisms
supporting visual short-term
memory for objects. Nature 440,
91–95.
Yarkoni, T. (2009). Big correlations in
little studies: inflated fMRI corre-
lations reflect low statistical power.
Commentary on Vul et al. (2009).
Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 4, 294–298.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 30 December 2012; accepted:
13 February 2013; published online: 04
March 2013.
Citation: Stout DM, Shackman
AJ and Larson CL (2013) Failure
to filter: anxious individuals show
inefficient gating of threat from working
memory. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:58.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00058
Copyright © 2013 Stout, Shackman
and Larson. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are
credited and subject to any copyright
notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 58 | 10
